OKLAHOMA STATE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
INFORMATION SERVICES DIVISION

EVALUATION OF THE
OKLAHOMA CITY GANG AND VIOLENT CRIME PROGRAM
PROJECT NUMBER 2007-DD-BX-0631
BJA FY 07 TARGETING VIOLENT CRIME INITIATIVE

An Evaluation Report
SUBMITTED TO THE OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the
Memorandum of Understanding between the
Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation and Oklahoma City Police Department

By
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INTRODUCTION

In January 2008, the City of Oklahoma City received a grant award from the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) for a project called the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program. The project, funded under the BJA FY 07 Targeting Violent Crime Initiative, recognized the growing problem of gang violence in Oklahoma City. The project proposed specific activities to combat gang violence; it contained a plan to fund those activities; and it provided for an evaluation to determine the effectiveness of those activities at increasing prosecutions and reducing gang violence.

The City of Oklahoma City authorized the Oklahoma City Police Department to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation for the purpose of conducting the evaluation. The evaluation was supported by Grant No. 2007-DD-BX-0631 awarded by BJA. The evaluation period ranged from March 9, 2010 to June 11, 2010.

Utilizing an evaluation management process, evaluators at the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation conducted multiple assessments that addressed the program’s need, theory, process, and impact. Overall, the evaluators make the following five conclusions.

1. Oklahoma City reported a documented gang problem, and additional resources were necessary to implement suppression, intervention, and prevention activities at a level that would reduce and minimize the extent of
the problem. The grant award for the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program provided funding for those additional resources.

2. The program theory as described in the application for funding contained a satisfactory level of logic and plausibility. In general, the program’s functions, activities, and components were well-defined, feasible, and appropriate for the overall goals and objectives.

3. The Oklahoma City Police Department demonstrated a high level of fidelity to the program theory. In general, the department implemented and administered the program’s functions, activities, and components as they were designed.

4. Substantial activity took place during the program, which yielded several indicators of the program’s ability to improve public safety. Seventy cases worked as part of the program were accepted for prosecution. It is reasonable to believe that many of these cases would have gone undetected without the resources the program made available. Effects of the program on long-term changes in gang-related crime and violence were more difficult to assess. The program will require more data, collected over a longer period, in order to determine its impact on gang-related crime in Oklahoma City.

5. The Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program contributed to both structural and cultural changes in the Oklahoma City Police Department. Structurally, the department now has systems and standardized processes in
place to address the gang problem. Culturally, the program changed the
mindset of officers, and intelligence-led policing (ILP) is now widely practiced.

The Oklahoma City Police Department would like to build on the successes it
achieved through the program. Therefore, the evaluation concludes with
recommendations for sustaining the program. Recommendations pertain to training,
intelligence-led policing, and information sharing.
FINDINGS

The Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program evaluation is organized into four separate but related evaluation methods: needs assessment, assessment of program theory, assessment of program process, and impact assessment. The structure and content of these assessments are organized around a logic model, which is a useful tool for identifying and describing the various components of a social program. The report provides evaluation findings within each assessment, and a final section summarizes these findings into conclusions regarding the overall effectiveness of the program.

LOGIC MODEL

According to Kegler and Honecutt (2008:3), logic models “Provide a visual depiction of how a program is supposed to work.” They describe in a tabular format how program operations are designed to produce specific goals or outcomes. Logic models tend to share basic components, including inputs, activities, outputs, outcomes, and goals. The Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program logic model (Figure 1) is organized into six components. The subsequent sections describe these components and how they relate to the assessments that follow.

Conditions. The first component in the logic model is conditions. It identifies social conditions and contexts that contribute to the need for a program. Conditions that necessitated the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program included an
increase in gang presence and an increase in gang-related violence. To more fully explain and understand these conditions, the first evaluation method in the report is a needs assessment.

**Inputs.** Inputs comprise the “Resources that go into a program” (Kegler and Honeycutt 2008:5). These resources can include human capital and social capital as well as physical resources. Inputs (listed in Figure 1) include mapping software and field interview cards. From an overall evaluation perspective, these inputs are best described in the assessment of program theory.

**Activities.** This component refers to the “Actual events or actions” (Kegler and Honeycutt 2008:5) that the program undertook. Activities in the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program included overtime hours for police officers and data entry into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. The assessment of program process describes if and how the activities of the program corresponded to the inputs and design of the program.

**Outputs.** Outputs are the “Direct results of program activities (Kegler and Honeycutt 2008:5), and they are typically designed as measurements of activities. For instance, if the activity is to provide overtime hours for police officers to make contact with gang members, outputs may include the number of overtime hours worked, the number of contacts made, and the number of arrests. The impact assessment addresses the program’s outputs.

**Outcomes (intermediate).** The impact assessment also addresses outcomes, which are the “Sequence of changes triggered by the program” (Kegler and Honeycutt
As indicated in the application for funding for the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program, the first measure of overall effectiveness is the change in the number of cases prosecuted (2007:10). From an evaluation perspective, this would classify as an intermediate outcome. It is an important change that the program intends to produce, but it is not necessarily the overarching goal of the program.

**Outcomes (long-term).** The final component of the logic model is long-term outcomes. The second measure of overall effectiveness identified in the application for funding is the change in major violent criminal/gang activity in Oklahoma City. This is a long-term outcome, and it is addressed in the impact assessment.
Figure 1. Logic Model of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditions</th>
<th>Inputs</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Outputs (intermediate)</th>
<th>Outcomes (long-term)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increase in gang presence</td>
<td>Police reports</td>
<td>Overtime hours for police officers</td>
<td>Increase in number of cases prosecuted</td>
<td>Incidental reduction in crime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in gang-related violence</td>
<td>Calls for service</td>
<td>Overtime hours for non-commissioned employees</td>
<td>Number of arrests made as a result of overtime</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in overall level of crime</td>
<td>Gang Intelligence Unit expertise</td>
<td>Increase police presence</td>
<td>Number of cases made as a result of the data collection</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illegal activities include:</td>
<td>NCIC Database</td>
<td>Citizen education</td>
<td>Number of cases entered into NCIC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Vandalism</td>
<td>Intelligence equipment</td>
<td>Yard signs</td>
<td>Number of gang-related crimes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Prostitution</td>
<td>Surveillance equipment</td>
<td>Enter data into the NCIC Database</td>
<td>Number and amounts of drugs seized</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Auto Theft</td>
<td>Mapping software</td>
<td>Share intelligence information</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Rape</td>
<td>Cameras</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Drive-by Shootings</td>
<td>Office equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Identity Theft</td>
<td>Field interview cards</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Extortion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Assaulots</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Robbery</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>- Gun Violence</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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NEEDS ASSESSMENT

The evaluation begins with a needs assessment to describe the social context in which the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program operated. A needs assessment is “An evaluative study that answers questions about the social conditions a program is intended to address and the need for the program” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004:64). Depending on the nature of the program being implemented, a needs assessment may vary in what it encompasses, including descriptions of target populations and service needs. For this assessment, the objectives are to define and describe the problem addressed by the program.

Defining the Problem

To develop a nominal definition of the problem for this needs assessment, evaluators utilized two data sources. The first data source was a bill passed by the Oklahoma Legislature in 2007, which provided legislative findings related to gang violence. The second data source was the City of Oklahoma City’s application for funding for this program, which specified a statement of the problem.

A political definition of the problem. During its 2007 regular session, the Oklahoma Legislature passed House Bill No. 1760, which created the Oklahoma Statewide Gang Intervention Steering Committee, and House Bill No. 1895, which established the Oklahoma Youth and Gang Violence Coordinating Council. While each group had similar but distinct duties, the overarching goal of these groups was described in the legislative findings in H.B. 1895, Section 1 (2007):
The State of Oklahoma finds that youth and gang violence continues to grow in Oklahoma, decimating the lives of many youths and families in both urban and rural communities. The State of Oklahoma further finds that while youth and gang violence continues to rise, the funding, resources and programs responding to youth and gang violence are decreasing. The State of Oklahoma further finds that the programs and initiatives responding to the problem of youth and gang violence in Oklahoma are not coordinated, with little intervention or input from law enforcement, the communities and government agencies. Therefore, the people of the State of Oklahoma declare that we must respond to the problem of youth and gang violence by creating a statewide coordinating council that brings law enforcement, communities and government agencies together to identify, evaluate and coordinate the modification of current programs and services and work to identify more funding for those programs and services. (Pp. 1-2)

From a needs assessment perspective, legislative findings that address a problem are informative because defining social problems is often a political process (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004:105-108). While the findings do not specifically address gang and violent crime in Oklahoma City, they do provide a broader social context for understanding the problem that exists. In addition, the claims in the legislative findings add concurrent validity to claims made by the City of Oklahoma City.
**A programmatic definition of the problem.** Just as political definitions are necessary for determining need, so are definitions proposed by program managers and those closest to the problem being addressed. Evaluators determined that Oklahoma City Police Department (OCPD) officials had significant input into the application for funding, particularly as it related to research and statistics on gang-related violence. As a result, the City of Oklahoma City offered the following statement of problem in its application for funding: “Since 2000, there has been a dramatic increase in gang-related violence, which has made the reduction of gang violence and other violence a primary public safety issue for the City of Oklahoma City” (2007:4). The application added to this statement by providing research and statistics that supported the claim, including information regarding drive-by shootings and gang-related homicides.

**A needs-based, nominal definition of the problem.** Based on information from the previous two sections, the needs assessment provides the following definition of the problem: According to political and programmatic claims, gang-related crime and other violent activity pose a significant threat to public safety at both the state and local levels. Oklahoma City has a documented gang problem that requires suppression, intervention, and prevention activities that exceed the normal courses of action for law enforcement. As a result, additional resources are necessary to implement these activities at a level that will reduce and minimize the extent of the gang problem in Oklahoma City.
Describing the Extent of the Problem

The second objective of the needs assessment is to describe the extent of the problem. The first data source, an analysis of gangs in Oklahoma, explains how gangs are dispersed throughout the state and how they are concentrated in larger urban areas, including Oklahoma County. The second data source, research and statistics from OCPD, describes the involvement of gangs in drive-by shootings and homicides.

Dispersion and concentration of gangs. Research by Dr. Michael R. Wilds, Associate Professor at Northeastern State University, provides evidence of both the statewide distribution of gangs and the concentration of gangs within a small number of counties, including Oklahoma County (2009). From a survey of 361 Oklahoma law enforcement agencies, Wilds reports that 1,026 distinct gang sets are located within Oklahoma, comprised of an estimated 13,512 members. The number of gang sets and gang members increased from their reported levels in 2006, when law enforcement agencies reported 1,006 gang sets and 13,477 gang members in Oklahoma.

According to survey data reported by Wilds, gangs are geographically dispersed across the state. Law enforcement agencies in 62 of the state’s 77 counties (80.5 percent) reported one or more gang sets residing in their counties. Law enforcement agencies in the panhandle counties (Cimarron, Texas, and Beaver) reported gang sets in their areas, as did agencies in Ottawa County (northeastern Oklahoma), Jackson County (southwestern Oklahoma), and McCurtain County (southeastern Oklahoma).

The distribution of gang sets across the state is not even, however, as three counties (Oklahoma, Tulsa, and Comanche) account for 59.8 percent of all gang sets.
The concentration in areas with large cities is consistent with research by Klein (1995). Oklahoma County had the highest reported number of gang sets at 234, which is 22.8 percent of the state’s total. Using state and county population data, Wilds reported that the rate of gang membership is 3.7 gang members per 1,000 population. The rate for Oklahoma County is 7.2 gang members per 1,000 population, which ranks third behind Comanche County (13.5) and Tulsa County (7.3). The most prevalent gangs in Oklahoma include Bloods, Crips, Hispanic gangs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, and Hate Groups. According to Wilds, each of these gangs is present in Oklahoma County, which is consistent with statistics from OCPD, which has documented more than 85 gangs with more than 4,000 members in the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Area (2007:4).

**Criminal activity of gangs.** The numbers of drive-by shootings and homicides attributed to gangs are two measures of gang-related criminal activity. Prior to the inception of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program, OCPD reported a steady increase in the annual number of drive-by shootings (Table 1). OCPD reported 124 drive-by shootings in 2003. Shootings increased during the next two years, to 192 in 2004 and 260 in 2005. The frequency of drive-by shootings in 2005 represented a 109.7 percent increase from 2003.

The number of drive-by shootings declined to 142 in 2007, the year prior to the program’s inception, but that number still exceeded the frequency of shootings in 2003. From a needs assessment perspective, the evaluators conclude that the trend in drive-by shootings from 2003 through 2006 is consistent with how the gang problem is defined as a serious threat to public safety.
The annual percent of homicides attributed to gangs also increased during the period prior to the inception of the program (Table 2), jumping from 10% in 2004 to 17% in 2005, and then dropping back to 9% in 2006 and 2007. These statistics are also consistent with the definition of gangs as a threat to public safety, and they justify the need for intervention. (Data for homicides after program implementation are also reported in Table 2 and are referred to in the Impact Assessment on pp. 42-44.)

### Table 1. Oklahoma City Drive-by Shootings, By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Drive-by Shootings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>142</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 2. Oklahoma City Gang-Related Homicides, By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Homicides*</th>
<th>Gang-Related Homicides**</th>
<th>Percent of Homicides</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Homicides as reported on the Uniform Crime Report (using UCR definition)
** Gang-related data provided by the Oklahoma City Police Department
**Needs Assessment Summary**

Using political and programmatic claims regarding gang-related violence, the needs assessment proposed a nominal definition of the problem, indicating that gang-related crime and other violent activity pose a significant threat to public safety at both the state and local levels. Empirical research on gang sets in Oklahoma and gang activity in Oklahoma City describes the extent of the problem. Combined, this information provides answers “about the social conditions a program is intended to address and the need for the program” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004:64).

**ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM THEORY**

According to Rossi, Lipsey, and Freemen (2004), “An assessment of program theory focuses on questions relating to the way the program is conceptualized and designed” (p. 55). The assessment makes determinations regarding the program’s logic and plausibility in relation to its goals and objectives. It describes the five parts of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program. These five parts comprise the program theory, which includes administrative and operational plans, as well as assumptions of how these plans address the need for the program. From a logic model perspective, inputs are identified and described in an assessment of program theory. Figure 2 on page 15 summarizes the objective and implementation strategy for each part. The following sections then describe each part in detail.
Figure 2. Assessment of Program Theory: Five Parts of the Program Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part I</th>
<th>Part II</th>
<th>Part III</th>
<th>Part IV</th>
<th>Part V</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Identify target areas</strong></td>
<td><strong>Increase Police Presence and Gather Intelligence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Compile Intelligence</strong></td>
<td><strong>Data Entry</strong></td>
<td><strong>Criminal Case Development</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Objective</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identify areas with high levels of violence, gang activity, and crime.</td>
<td>Increase police presence, fund overtime hours for off-duty police to gather intelligence.</td>
<td>Funnel intelligence to the OKC Criminal Intelligence Unit.</td>
<td>Approve additional overtime for non-commissioned employees to enter data into NCIC.</td>
<td>Use intelligence provided to develop cases against identified criminals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Implementation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analyze police reports, calls for service, and gang unit intelligence to identify high crime areas</td>
<td>Identify and make contact with gang members</td>
<td>Use sources to develop timely intelligence</td>
<td>Update and maintain the NCIC database using intelligence gathered in steps I and II.</td>
<td>Select targets and develop complex case preparation utilizing:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify property owned, used or controlled by gangs</td>
<td>Compile, map, and distribute geographical information to local law enforcement</td>
<td></td>
<td>Electronic Surveillance Asset Identification Other available resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Part 1: Identify Target Areas**

Part 1 would be an effort to identify the areas of the city and surrounding jurisdictions that have the highest propensity for gang-related crimes, violence, and gang members. This will be done by using police reports, calls for service, and from information and intelligence gathered by the Gang Unit (Program Narrative, p. 7).

**Part 2: Increase Police Presence and Gather Intelligence**

Part 2 will be accomplished by the use of off-duty officers working in an overtime capacity. These officers will be assigned to work in the predefined areas. Their tasks will be to:

- Identify gangs, gang members and associates and make contact with them.
- Identify property owned, used or controlled by gangs and use tools such as Code Enforcement to correct violations through the Program Coordinator.
- Develop sources and sharing [of] intelligence information. This will be accomplished by providing access to the SharePoint Intelligence Program [collaboration software – see pg. 25 below] to other law enforcement agencies who are directly affected by the gang members and other violent offender[s] who live and are involved in criminal activity in Oklahoma City (Program Narrative, pp. 7-8).
Part 3: Compile Intelligence

Part 3 takes place when the information obtained from the work of these officers will be funneled into the Oklahoma City Criminal Intelligence Unit. The investigators and analysis personnel assigned will then:

- Use I2 [intelligence analysis software], mapping software, police reports, phone records, and field interview cards to develop actionable and timely intelligence. This will be shared on a daily basis through the development of a Share Point program and delivered to the patrol officers Mobile Data Terminal.

- Identify gang members and other violent offenders through residential addresses and other demographics and biographical information. Then produce a geographical demonstration through IMap Data [mapping software] and a report and deliver these to both field officers and command staff. This information could be produced in a hard copy or entered into other analytical tools such as I2. This information could be shared with other law enforcement jurisdictions.

- Monitor the release of known gang members and other violent offenders from federal and state custody. The information will be shared through the Share Point Intelligence Program (Program Narrative, p. 8).
Part 4: Use NCIC

Part 4 will occur during an overtime program where qualified non-commissioned employees who have been trained to make entry into the NCIC computer system will enter all known gang members into the NCIC Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File [VGTOF] to alert officers to potentially dangerous gang members (Program Narrative, pp. 8-9).

Part 5: Use Intelligence

Part 5 will take place after intelligence is developed on known gang members and violent offenders. The Oklahoma City Police Department, in conjunction with other agencies involved in Project GRIND [Gangs Removed, Isolated, Neutralized, and Dismantled] will select targets and develop complex case preparation aimed at strategically eradicating illegal gang activity through a coordinated and comprehensive approach. This will be done by using the collective talent and expertise of local and federal enforcement authorities and by identifying gang organizations and related gang associates. This will ultimately disrupt and dismantle the illegal activities of gangs operating in Oklahoma City. Focusing resources on street level enforcement up through the gangs’ organizational hierarchy ensures a comprehensive multi-level and multi-pronged strategy. Additional tasks will be to:

- Monitor street-level intelligence, including traffic stops and/or arrests of gang members, associates and other violent offenders.
• Develop intelligence and evidence using resources such as electronic surveillance (Pole Cams and wire taps), grand jury subpoenas and search warrants. Investigators will utilize state of the art equipment to monitor phone conversations by targeted individuals.

• Identify assets and instruments used to facilitate illegal activity.

• Identify and interview known gang members and other violent offenders who are serving time in state and/or federal prisons.

• Coordinate and develop with both state and federal prosecutors plans to aggressively develop proactive and historical evidence collection targeting gang organizations, gang members, other known violent offenders and assets in order to coordinate complex case strategies.

• Coordinate with the BATFE [Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives] on identifying individual[s] and business[es] who are selling guns which are in the possession of and being used in criminal activity by gang members and violent offenders. This would be accomplished through information obtained from the BATFE Office of Strategic Intelligence and Information and shared with GRIND Task Force members.

• Investigator and OCPD Street Crimes Units will be used in an overtime capacity to conduct investigations and surveillance of targets within the identified area (Program Narrative, pp. 9-10).
Assessment of Program Theory Summary

Using standard evaluation methodology, the evaluators conclude that the program theory as described above contained a satisfactory level of logic and plausibility. In general, the program’s components, activities, and functions were well-defined, feasible, and appropriate for the overall goals and objectives. Evaluators did not identify any problematic issues in the program’s design that could contribute to implementation problems.

ASSESSMENT OF PROGRAM PROCESS

Following the assessment of program theory, the third evaluation method is an assessment of program process. This is “An evaluative study that answers questions about program operations, implementation, and service delivery. Also known as a process evaluation or an implementation assessment” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004:62). The overarching goal of this assessment is to determine whether the program providers implemented and administered the program as it was designed. In the following sections, the evaluators offer general observations and conclusions; a detailed examination of how program providers implemented and administered each of the program’s five parts; and a summary of the program process assessment.

General Observations and Conclusions

Based on a comprehensive review of needs and program design, and in-depth observations regarding the delivery of program services, the evaluators conclude that
OCPD demonstrated an appropriate and satisfactory level of fidelity to the program theory. In general, OCPD implemented and administered the program functions, components, and activities as they were designed. A few implementation problems, which are described below, negatively affected the program’s delivery system, but from an overall evaluative perspective, the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program performed as it was intended.

In semistandardized interviews with program staff, evaluators asked OCPD officers, “In general, how successful do you think the program has been in achieving its objectives?” The unanimous response was, “Extremely successful.” OCPD officers indicated that the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program had been the police department’s best-run program, and that all other programs were now based on this model. One staff member suggested that this program has “changed a mindset” in the police department by reducing the problem of stove-piping, where officers in different units of the department possess but do not share critical information that could lead to quicker identification of suspects and arrests. According to program staff, the mindset is now much more oriented toward information sharing through an intelligence-led policing model.

In the assessment of program process, evaluators found evidence to substantiate these claims. The following sections describe this evidence, using three data sources for each of the five parts of the program. First, evaluators provide qualitative observations from interviews and follow-up contacts with program staff; these observations comprise the bulk of the assessment of program process. Second,
evaluators provide qualitative and quantitative observations from content analysis of documents and reports provided by OCPD. Third, evaluators provide commentary on case studies provided by OCPD regarding the program’s activities.

**Part 1: Identify Target Areas**

*Interviews with program staff.* From the program narrative, evaluators developed the assumption that specific locations in Oklahoma City would be designated as target areas based on gang and violent crime, and that these areas would remain static over the lifecycle of the program. Interviews with program staff indicated that this assumption was incorrect. While there are measurable patterns and trends in the spatial distribution of crime, OCPD responded to gang and violent crime in a dynamic manner, assigning overtime officers to whatever locations required those resources at any given time. OCPD initially acted in a reactionary manner; officers would be assigned to these areas after calls or reports of gang and violent crime. Program staff reported that OCPD quickly transitioned to “data-driven intelligence,” where officer assignments and other resource allocations were based on the proactive analysis and utilization of police reports, calls for service, and information and intelligence gathered by the Gang Unit. A detective and two civilian analysts devoted most of their time to analyzing and synthesizing these data.

*Content analysis.* To assess fidelity with the program design, evaluators asked OCPD officers about the methods used to identify target areas. The program design included police reports and calls for service. Officers indicated that each of these
methods was used. According to performance indicator data for 2008 and 2009, OCPD conducted 379 police reports and accepted 1,210 calls related to gang and violent crime.

The program design also included information and intelligence gathered by the Gang Unit as a method to identify target areas. Program staff indicated that this information and intelligence included the frequency and distribution of Uniform Crime Report (UCR) Part I crimes (murder, manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and arson), drive-by shootings, and graffiti. Using documents and reports from OCPD, including semi-annual progress reports submitted to the Bureau of Justice Assistance, evaluators conclude that program staff collected and analyzed this information.

**Case study.** From the perspective of program process, identifying target areas of the city and surrounding jurisdictions would be best accomplished through collaboration among multiple law enforcement agencies. Gangs in the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Area may operate in multiple police jurisdictions. Therefore, OCPD would be able to exhibit the highest levels of program fidelity if it involved agencies from surrounding areas. The following case study suggests that this collaboration took place.

Attendance at the OCPD Intelligence Led Policing meetings is encouraged throughout the metro area. Currently, the meetings are attended by the following police departments: Bethany, Midwest City, Del City, Spencer, OU Health Science Center, Norman, Village, and the Tinker Air Force Base Security Police.
Part 2: Increase Police Presence and Gather Intelligence

Interviews with program staff. Part two of the program included the use of overtime officers working in the target areas to identify gangs and make contact with their members. According to information collected during interviews, supervisors selected or referred police officers for the overtime program. Initially, 140 officers signed up to participate, and approximately 90 of these officers regularly worked overtime hours. These officers received two hours of formal training in intelligence-led policing before assignment to the program. From a program process perspective, the consistency among officers who participated improved the department’s ability to implement the program as designed. Excessive attrition and turnover could have led to inordinate resources devoted to recruitment and training rather than the activities of the program.

Evaluators asked program staff, “What actions did officers take to identify gangs, gang members, and associates? What actions did officers take to make contact with these groups and individuals?” Program staff stressed an aggressive and proactive approach to this part of the program: all of the time an officer was on shift for the program was to be spent developing intelligence on gangs and gang members. From a program process perspective, this emphasis on making contacts improved the department’s ability to implement the program as designed. A structure that also contributed to program fidelity was the field interview card, which overtime officers used to record information gathered during contacts with gang members. By standardizing the method in which officers collected and processed gang and gang
member information, OCPD developed an effective implementation mechanism. The
field interview card is discussed in more detail in the content analysis section.

In addition to identifying gangs, part two of the program required officers to
identify property owned, used or controlled by gangs. Information collected through
interviews indicates that communication and cameras played a key role in this activity.
First, program staff reported that officers participating in the program had good
communication skills, and part of making contact with gang members and identifying
property used by those members is knowing how to ask.

Second, a covert camera system was utilized in select locations to monitor
current criminal activity and to prevent future criminal activity. Program staff reported
that because of the camera system, several drive-by shootings had been prevented.
Staff also indicated that graffiti, or tagging, is currently a significant issue in the city; it
is not only a monetary issue, but also a quality of life issue. Therefore, OCPD placed
motion-activated cameras near billboards to watch for offenders attempting to tag
these structures. One OCPD officer indicated that cameras “will have lasting effects” on
the department’s ability to control these crimes.

A final requirement of part two was to share intelligence information with other
law enforcement agencies through a software program called SharePoint. OCPD officers
praised SharePoint for its ability to allow police officers to securely share confidential
and sensitive information in a Web-based environment with more secure and controlled
access than typical e-mail systems. One OCPD officer reported that the department
needed a way to get real-time information out to people that needed to know. The City
of Oklahoma City already had licenses for SharePoint, and the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program provided the impetus for utilizing the system. Program staff indicated that all OCPD divisions now use SharePoint.

When evaluators asked if OCPD shared information with other law enforcement agencies through SharePoint, program staff indicated that the department did not. According to program staff, SharePoint is an intranet, not an internet, system, so access to outside law enforcement agencies was not an option. As an alternative, when OCPD officers had any information that needed to be disseminated to other law enforcement agencies, officers forwarded it to the Oklahoma Information Fusion Center, which is located at the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation. From a program process perspective, it appears this part of the program was not implemented as designed. However, after analyzing and synthesizing the available information, the evaluators find that the program theory may not have been accurate in proposing to share intelligence with other agencies through SharePoint. The evaluators also suggest that dissemination of information through the Fusion Center could be an equally if not more effective method. As indicated on its Website, “The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center will serve as the focal point for the collection, assessment, analysis and dissemination of terrorism intelligence and other criminal activity information relating to Oklahoma” (2010). The evaluators therefore conclude that OCPD did in fact conform to the intent of the program design through its use of the Fusion Center.

**Content analysis.** One structure that OCPD used to standardize the information it received from officers participating in the program was the Gang Field Interview card
Upon contact with a potential gang member, an officer using the card would collect typical demographic information, such as date of birth, race, and sex. An officer would also collect information regarding gang affiliation, including whether the individual was an admitted gang member, had tattoos or other physical symbols of gang membership, or had a criminal history that indicated gang membership. Officers would complete Gang Field Interview cards for each and every contact with a gang member; if police had three separate contacts with a gang member, officers would complete three interview cards. As will be discussed in part three of the program, the Gang Intelligence Unit used these data to develop intelligence regarding gang activity in Oklahoma City, including networks of gang members and their affiliations.

Officers also utilized an overtime shift report to track their daily activities. Officers collected data on program activities, including calls, reports, field interview cards, and traffic stops. Officers recorded information on arrests, drugs seized, firearms seized, and contact made with gang members.
Case study. Evaluators conclude that OCPD implemented part two of the program with a high level of fidelity. Evidence indicates that OCPD developed specific structures and processes to collect information by officers working in an overtime capacity. This information was therefore available to officers throughout the police department through the intelligence-led policing model, as indicated in the following case study.

Santa Fe IMPACT officers were conducting surveillance in the area of SW 59th and S. May Av. A suspect was seen by officers engaging in a drug transaction in the parking lot of the Sonic and subsequently arrested. An officer recognized the suspect by name, due to the suspect’s information (involvement in hotel room larcenies of televisions sets) being discussed in an ILP meeting earlier that day. IMPACT officers were also able to confirm that the vehicle the suspect was in was similar to the vehicle captured in a frame shot from a surveillance video (also shown at the ILP meeting). During the inventory of said vehicle, officers were able to seize thousands of hotel receipts from a local hotel. The receipts were generated by the hotel and contained customers’ names and an impression of the credit card used. Two checkbooks were found in the vehicle as well. These checkbooks were reported stolen during a robbery and another stolen vehicle. Also in the vehicle was a leather jacket with a brown and white stripe. The suspect’s ID was in the pocket of this jacket, which can be seen on hotel TV theft surveillance videos. A coconspirator was arrested with the suspect and decided to talk to investigators. The second suspect admitted to selling stolen TV’s in
Midwest City with the other suspect in exchange for methamphetamine. Officers also learned where the suspects were staying in a local motel. Officers were able to obtain a warrant for the room, where CDS and more hotel receipts were found. Also in the room was a post-it note with a 3rd suspect in the case. This person is a known suspect in other hotel room larcenies of TV’s. Two more previously unknown suspects were identified from surveillance video photos. Hefner IMPACT officers went to the location in Midwest City where the methamphetamine was purchased. Officers were able to stop the home owner from leaving the house with an additional ½ ounce of meth. This person assisted the officers and was successful in making introductions where IMPACT officers were able to buy 4 more ounces of methamphetamine at a residence on the south side of Oklahoma City.

**Part 3: Develop Intelligence**

*Interviews with program staff.* The program theory for part three indicated that information and intelligence would be processed, analyzed, and synthesized by investigators and analysts, particularly through the use of mapping techniques. These activities formed the foundation for developing intelligence that would be shared among law enforcement personnel. Program staff reported that mapping activities were integral to the program, as they provided a visual depiction of gang and violent crime that aided in suppression, intervention, and prevention efforts.
The program theory also indicated that OCPD would monitor the release of known gang members and other violent offenders from federal and state custody. Evaluators determined that OCPD received information from the Oklahoma Department of Corrections (DOC) regarding released offenders. According to program staff, DOC submitted this information to OCPD within one month of release. OCPD then mapped the residential addresses of released offenders. Evaluators did not find evidence that OCPD monitored the release of offenders from federal custody.

**Content analysis.** The program narrative contained two examples of developing intelligence through the use of maps. The first example, “Density of Known Gang Members Within The City of Oklahoma City” (2007:4), plotted the locations of known gang members. The second map included in the program narrative was, “Drive By Shootings for 2006” (2007:6). This map displayed the distribution of drive-by shootings in the city’s various divisions, including Hefner, Santa Fe, Springlake, and Will Rogers Patrol Division. This form of intelligence allowed law enforcement officers to observe the spatial distribution of gang members in Oklahoma City, and to make more informed decisions regarding allocation of resources.

**Case study.** Evaluators identified training as an effective component of developing and sharing intelligence. The assessment of part two indicated that officers participating in the program received two hours of formal training in intelligence-led policing. The following case study from OCPD provided additional insight into the processes and outcomes of this training.
In the fall of 2008, OCPD Officers completed Intelligence Led Policing In-Service Training through the Oklahoma City Police Department. During this training several items were discussed, but a few themes were especially emphasized. One such theme was that in this day and age everything is important and there are no unimportant pieces of raw information from a law enforcement standpoint. Further, Officers were encouraged not to dismiss any piece of information, especially as it may relate to domestic or foreign terrorism. Another important theme emphasized was that if officers did come across information of this type, they needed to make sure it was forwarded to those who can do something with it (OCPD Criminal Intel, JTTF [Joint Terrorism Task Force], etc.). On this second point we provided multiple avenues on how this could be accomplished, to include something as simple and direct as a phone call.

**Part 4: Use NCIC**

*Interviews with program staff.* In part four of the program design, OCPD utilized non-commissioned employees to enter data on known gang members into the Gang file of the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) database. NCIC is managed by the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division. It is an information source that is used throughout the nation on a continuous basis; according to the FBI’s Website (2010), NCIC has an average of 7.5 million transactions each day. It relies on local and state law enforcement agencies to submit information to 19 different files, including the Gang file. As part of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program,
OCPD submitted information to NCIC on 2,328 individuals that the department had identified and validated as a gang member.

**Content analysis.** To ensure that the department’s submissions to the NCIC Gang file were valid and reliable, program staff utilized standard definitions of gangs and gang members from the U.S. Department of Justice. OCPD trained non-commissioned employees to apply these definitions when preparing submissions to the Gang file.

**Case study.** One manifest benefit of entering known gang members into the NCIC Gang file is the ability of other law enforcement agencies and officers to identify a suspect as a gang member during a traffic stop, arrest, or other incident. The information is available as a source of intelligence that may not otherwise be available. The following case study describes an incident during which an OCPD officer utilized the NCIC Gang file during a traffic stop. Evaluators suggest that this case study highlights the interdependent relationship between the program’s theory, process, and impact. In other words, by implementing the program as it was designed, OCPD produced outcomes consistent with the overall goals and objectives of the program.

An OCPD Officer stopped a vehicle in traffic. During the course of the traffic stop the officer became concerned about the two occupants and the chemical odor emitting from the vehicle. Rather than dismiss the cues, the officer continued to investigate, obtaining identifying information and stories as to their recent activities. During a records check, Officer Roberts received an NCIC-VGTOF Watch List hit on one occupant, and later learned the other occupant was a
subject of suspicion by Federal authorities. This officer, by all accounts, did exactly as trained and never let on to the occupants that at least one of them was on the VGTOF Watch List. Instead, he continued to gather information on what he saw, heard, and smelled at the scene. The officer then forwarded a four page email to an OCPD Inspector with the FBI’s JTTF.

**Part 5: Use Intelligence**

**Interviews with program staff.** The final part of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program required a comprehensive application of intelligence and other information to OCPD’s suppression, intervention, and prevention activities. Interviews with program staff provided evidence that OCPD implemented this part with a high level of fidelity. Much is this evidence is quantitative in nature and relates to the impact of the program; this information is therefore included in the section on impact assessment. Overall, evaluators conclude that OCPD conducted the activities enumerated in the program theory. In addition, OCPD provided performance measurement data, to both the Bureau of Justice Assistance and the evaluators, to document their activities.

**Content analysis.** In its progress report to the Bureau of Justice Assistance for the reporting period of January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2009, OCPD described the following accomplishments.

We are currently using four pole cameras to gain investigative information relative to several criminal cases. Two cameras are being utilized to obtain information in high gang/drug locations, which are tied to federal investigations.
A third camera is being used on a theft ring that involves stolen vehicles and property, as well as stolen firearms. It is anticipated this investigation will lead to a RICO case [see Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act]. The suspects in this case have a violent history and have assaulted police officers in the past. The fourth camera is being used in Moore, Oklahoma to develop probable cause on a multi-jurisdictional investigation involving illegal drug sales.

Evaluators observed how this reported accomplishment utilized intelligence gathered through pole cameras for federal investigations, a RICO case (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), and a multi-jurisdictional drug case. This is a broad use of intelligence that is consistent with the program theory.

Case study. The use of intelligence was the fifth and final part in a logical and plausible program design. To demonstrate the utility of this design, and the ability of OCPD to implement the program as intended, the department provided the following case study. It highlights the use of intelligence in a complex criminal case.

On December 22\textsuperscript{nd}, 2008, at approx. 0055 hours, an officer initiated a voluntary contact with a subject in a high crime area. This subject was ultimately arrested for possession of narcotics. While filling out paperwork, the arrested individual told the officer about a subject he knew that had just gotten out of the military and was making and selling Improvised Explosive Devices (IED’s) and other home made weapons. The arrested individual advised that this subject was trying to sell the items he made to drug dealers and other criminals in our city. After booking the individual into jail, the officer included his statements about
the subject making and selling IED’s in his report. Further, he also notified his chain of command and caused phone calls to be made to investigators with Special Investigations and the Bomb Squad. As he is doing this, A Divisional ILP officer who was tasked with reviewing every report that came into their division for items relating to different pre-established arenas, keyed in on the officer’s report and forwarded it to an Intelligence Unit Investigator. Less than 24 hours later, the subject that was making and selling IED’s and other weapons was identified and arrested in the act of delivering a completed IED designed to be used on a vehicle. Also in this time frame multiple interviews were conducted that helped illustrate the scope of the crime and searches of vehicles and houses were conducted by specialists from our department. These searches yielded multiple homemade shoulder mounted weapons and nine (9) IED’s. Also recovered were IED’s in various states of construction and components and raw powders used to make the IED’s. The main defendant in this case has been in custody awaiting trial since January 22nd, 2008. The case is scheduled to go before a jury in July 2010. Currently, the subject is charged with 10 counts of manufacturing or possessing an explosive device.

**Implementation Issues**

At the program’s inception, the Oklahoma City Office of Weed and Seed provided much of the grant administration and management for the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program. Weed and Seed was part of the city’s Neighborhood Services
Division. During 2009, the city restructured the Neighborhood Services Division and placed Weed and Seed under the authority of OCPD. The department therefore assumed responsibility for all of the grant program’s administration and operations, effective July 1, 2009.

At that time, OCPD administrators stopped the overtime program while they reviewed the budget expenditures to ensure compliance with department policies and procedures. Once administrators determined that they could fund additional overtime hours, they reinstated the overtime program in March 2010. During the administrative review, program staff did not collect data for the second half of 2009 that would have been used to measure outputs and outcomes. Due to the gap in data collection, evaluators were unable to assess the overall effectiveness of the program; the impact assessment provides more detail on the effects this had on the evaluation. Overall, evaluators determined that this structural change in the placement of the program did not have a substantial effect on the implementation of the program.

**Assessment of Program Process Summary**

Evaluators utilized interviews with program staff, content analyses, and case studies to assess program process. The overarching goal of this assessment was to determine whether the program providers implemented and administered the program as it was designed. By examining the program as a whole and each part individually, the evaluators conclude that OCPD implemented the program with a high level of fidelity. With few exceptions, OCPD adhered to the program theory. The evaluators also
determined that exceptions that were identified did not detract from the implementation of the program in any substantive way. In the case of sharing information with other law enforcement agencies through the Fusion Center rather than the SharePoint system, OCPD likely selected a preferred method that ultimately satisfied the intention of the program theory.

The program did experience challenges in implementing the program. Specifically, a structural change in the placement of Weed and Seed and the grant program produced a gap in both the program process and the data needed to measure outcomes. While this gap affected the evaluation’s impact assessment, evaluators determined that it did not substantially affect the implementation of the program. OCPD still demonstrated a high level of fidelity in its program process.

**IMPACT ASSESSMENT**

Practically speaking, the most important part of any program evaluation is a determination of whether or not the program worked. This determination is called an impact assessment, which is defined as, “An evaluative study that answers questions about program outcomes and impact on the social conditions it is intended to ameliorate. Also known as an impact evaluation or an outcome evaluation” (Rossi, Lipsey, and Freeman 2004:63). This impact assessment of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program will focus on the internal accomplishments of the program itself and on those external outcomes deemed most important in the determination of program effectiveness: 1) the number of cases prosecuted; and 2) the incidental
change in major violent criminal/gang activity. For these analyses, the number of prosecutions is considered an intermediate, or short-term measure of program success (an immediate reflection of the increased scrutiny in the high crime areas of Oklahoma City), while the change in major violent crime is considered a long-term measure of program success (which may only be noticeable over a long period of sustained program implementation).

**Methods**

The internal and external data collected for this evaluation were tabulated and analyzed to determine the impact of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program. Due to missing data in the second half of 2009 (a result of administrative changes and budget constraints beyond the program’s control), no statistical analyses can be made to determine the impact of the program over time on internal data (the number of gang members arrested, the number of firearms seized by the program, etc.). Likewise, the absence of a viable control group makes it impossible to statistically demonstrate the success or failure of the program over the course of its implementation. However, the accomplishments of the program are reported, along with some statistical analyses of independence and linear associations between internal and external program outcomes (using UCR data) and incidental changes in the total numbers of violent crimes.
Results

The results are divided into three categories: 1) activities and outputs performed or produced by the program; 2) intermediate outcomes (number of prosecutions); and 3) long-term outcomes (changes in UCR violent crimes).

Activities and Outputs. Data collected by the program indicate that substantial activity took place during the implementation of the program, with 77 officers working 1,664 overtime hours in 2008, and additional hours worked during the first half of 2009. Some of the activities engaged in by these officers during their overtime hours are included below (Table 3). These activities yielded several key indicators (Table 4) of the performance of the program in improving the safety of the target areas with regard to criminal/gang-related violent crime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 3. Program Activities, By Year</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police Reports</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Calls to Police</td>
<td>1,020</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>1,210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Stops</td>
<td>1,064</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>1,327</td>
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<tr>
<td>Citations</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drive-bys Worked</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Officer Assists</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Program Outputs, By Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>2008</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Search Warrants Served</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Cases Initiated</td>
<td>470</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>549</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested (Violent Offenses)</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrested (Non-Violent Offenses)</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cases Accepted for Prosecution</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence Submissions</td>
<td>2,065</td>
<td>791</td>
<td>2,856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs Disrupted</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gangs Dismantled</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

--- Indicates no data available

**Outcomes (Intermediate).** The total number of cases prosecuted in the target areas was expected to serve as an intermediate indicator of program effectiveness. However, in the absence of this information, the number of cases accepted for prosecution serves as a surrogate for the number of actual prosecutions. Seventy cases worked during the overtime hours provided for by the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program were accepted for prosecution in Oklahoma County. While it is true that some of these cases may still have been prosecuted had the program not been in place, it is reasonable to believe that many of the cases accepted for prosecution would have gone undetected without the resources the program made available. Again, only one full year of data is available for analysis, so no change in the number of accepted cases can be determined.

**Outcomes (Long-term).** The final outcome intended to determine the effectiveness of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program is the number of major violent crimes in the program target (high crime) areas of Oklahoma City.
absence of these data, we looked at UCR data for the number of homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults in all of Oklahoma City. Tests of independence between each of the four violent crime categories and the numbers of felony arrests and misdemeanor arrests in the high crime areas of the city (on a monthly basis) all gave statistically significant results ($p < 0.001$ – results not shown), indicating that trends in violent crime in the program areas were associated with the larger trends in violent crime in the city as a whole. This indicates that changes in the number of violent crimes in Oklahoma City should reflect changes in the smaller high crime areas of the city. Tests for linear relationships between the four violent crimes and the numbers of felony arrests and misdemeanor arrests all came out to be insignificant ($p > 0.05$ – results not shown), indicating that changes in violent crime in Oklahoma City were not significantly associated (linearly) with the arrests made by the officers participating in the program.

These results appear to indicate that while arrests made in the high crime areas of Oklahoma City follow the same cyclical trends as the city in general, they cannot be used to linearly predict the number of violent crimes in the city (Figure 3). Unfortunately, this tells us that while the UCR data should follow the same general trends as the program target areas, it cannot be used to adequately approximate changes in the target areas over time. Therefore, whatever can be deduced from the following changes in the city at large may not accurately reflect the activities of the program.
The UCR data show that the total number of violent crimes stayed fairly consistent from 2007 through 2009 (Figures 3-4). The number of homicides decreased from 1.30% of the total to 1.27% (while increasing in number – see Table 2), the number of rapes decreased from 7.0% to 5.7%, the number of robberies decreased from 30.3% to 24.1%, and the number of aggravated assaults increased from 61.4% to 68.9% (Figure 5). The total change in violent crime was an increase of 12.4%.
One statistic of interest that did appear to change was the number of homicides attributable to gang violence, which doubled from 9% of all homicides in 2007 to 18% in 2009 (Figure 6). However, despite the appearance of drastic change for the worse,
this amounts to an increase from 5 gang-related homicides to 12 (see Table 2). Odds ratios for change between the three years all yielded insignificant results (Table 5). This indicates that the odds of having a homicide attributed to gangs were not significantly different between the three years, meaning the increase in gang-related homicides may simply be a result of normal variation from year to year. Other possible explanations include the likelihood that more homicides would be attributed to gangs with the additional contact with and intelligence about gang activity gained through the program (with no actual increase in gang-related homicides) and the possibility that national trends beyond the control of local law enforcement could explain the increase. Without a control group for comparison, it is impossible to tell what the results would have been had the program never been implemented.

![Figure 6. Gang-Related Homicides in Oklahoma City, By Year*](image)

*Homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults
**Before program implementation
Table 5. Odds Ratios for Gang-Related Homicides, 2007-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Odds Ratio</th>
<th>95% Confidence Interval</th>
<th>Significance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007 to 2008</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>0.18</td>
<td>1.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007 to 2009</td>
<td>0.52</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008 to 2009</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>2.36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Impact Assessment Summary**

Although the lack of sufficient data and a viable control group for comparison removes our ability to make a statistically significant determination of program effectiveness, based on the qualitative and quantitative results above, it appears that the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program performed as intended and achieved its desired beneficial impact on violent criminal/gang activity in the high crime areas of Oklahoma City. Consistent program implementation over a longer period of time with improved data collection practices would be more likely to result in concrete conclusions about the program’s actual impact on the community.

**OVERALL EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROGRAM**

The four assessments in this report addressed the program’s need, theory, process, and impact. Overall, evaluators make the following five conclusions regarding the overall effectiveness of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program.

1. Oklahoma City reported a documented gang problem, and additional resources were necessary to implement suppression, intervention, and prevention activities at a level that would reduce and minimize the extent of
the problem. The grant award for the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program provided funding for those additional resources.

2. The program theory as described in the application for funding contained a satisfactory level of logic and plausibility. In general, the program’s functions, activities, and components were well-defined, feasible, and appropriate for the overall goals and objectives.

3. The Oklahoma City Police Department demonstrated a high level of fidelity to the program theory. In general, the department implemented and administered the program’s functions, activities, and components as they were designed.

4. Substantial activity took place during the program, which yielded several indicators of the program’s ability to improve public safety. Seventy cases worked as part of the program were accepted for prosecution. It is reasonable to believe that many of these cases would have gone undetected without the resources the program made available. Effects of the program on long-term changes in gang-related crime and violence were more difficult to assess. The program will require more data, collected over a longer period, in order to determine its impact on gang-related crime in Oklahoma City.

5. The Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program contributed to both structural and cultural changes in the Oklahoma City Police Department. Structurally, the department now has systems and standardized processes in
place to address the gang problem. Culturally, the program changed the mindset of officers, and intelligence-led policing is now widely practiced.

From an overall evaluation perspective, the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program was successful in doing what it was intended to do. Because of the established need, a logical and plausible program theory, fidelity in the program implementation, and evidence of positive outcomes, the Oklahoma City Police Department may wish to continue the program. The following section provides recommendations for how the department could sustain the program once the federal grant award has concluded.
The final requirement for the evaluation is to make recommendations for how the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program could be sustained once federal funding is no longer available.

1. Incorporate intelligence-led policing training into orientation for newly recruited commissioned officers.

2. Continue to utilize intelligence-led policing theory in planning resource allocation throughout the city, namely identifying and targeting the high crime areas.

3. Maintain a consistent, trained work team for entering data into the NCIC database. Continue to assign data entry activities, including entering and validating gang members into NCIC, to light-duty officers.

4. Using the initial success of the program, develop a formal statement of program theory and design that represents the current practices of OCPD.

5. On a monthly basis, collect and analyze the key performance indicators to measure program effects.

6. Collect and analyze the outcomes of cases presented for prosecution to assess the effectiveness of the program.
7. Continue to collaborate and share intelligence with other law enforcement agencies in surrounding jurisdictions.

8. Continue to utilize the Oklahoma Information Fusion Center to communicate and disseminate intelligence information to other law enforcement agencies.

9. Expand the use of the pole cams to assist in the development of criminal cases.

10. Continue to rely on and enhance the features of the SharePoint program.

11. In the future, build the evaluation component in at the beginning of the program. Identify the data elements, collection procedures, and statistical analyses that will be used to evaluate the program’s effectiveness.

12. Consider re-evaluating the program in three years for a more complete assessment of the program’s impact on the community. If practical, identify a control group for the evaluation. Ideally, the control group would only receive the standard law enforcement response while the target areas would receive the enhanced response.
METHODOLOGY

EVALUATION MANAGEMENT PROCESS

The evaluators utilized a seven-phase evaluation management process (EMP) to conduct the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program evaluation. Dr. W. Dean Lee, head of the FBI’s Organizational Program Evaluation and Analysis Unit, designed the EMP, which forms the basis for the FBI’s Blue Book for Program Evaluations (2007). The following sections provide a brief description of the evaluators’ activities within each phase.

Phase 1: Determine Requirements

Lee indicates that phase one is typically utilized by an agency to identify which of its programs should be evaluated. For the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program, the application for funding included an evaluation component. Therefore, to complete phase 1, the evaluators identified the following three documents as the authority and requirements under which OSBI performed the evaluation:

- Program narrative for Project Number 2007-DD-BX-0631, funded by Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance
- Resolution by the City of Oklahoma City that the Chief of Police is authorized to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between OSBI and OCPD for statistical analysis services
• MOU between OSBI and OCPD stating the terms of a cooperative agreement whereby OSBI will provide statistical evaluation and analysis to assist OCPD in evaluating the effectiveness of its Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program.

**Phase 2: Identify Objectives**

The application for funding identified two primary objectives of the Oklahoma City Gang and Violent Crime Program. According to the program narrative, “The overall effectiveness will be demonstrated through the increased number of cases prosecuted and the incidental reduction in major violent criminal/gang activity in the high crime areas of the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Area.” From this information, the evaluators established two formal objective statements.

• **Objective 1:** Measure the change (outcome change) between the numbers of cases prosecuted before the program (outcome level) and during the program (outcome level).

• **Objective 2:** Measure the change (outcome change) in major violent criminal/gang activity in the high crime areas of the Oklahoma City Metropolitan Area before the program (outcome level) and during the program (outcome level).
**Phase 3: Select Research Design**

The evaluation utilized a mixed-methods approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis. Berg described this approach as triangulation, which “represents varieties of data, investigators, theories, and methods” (1998:5). Triangulation is a preferred methodology, particularly in qualitative research where multiple sources of information and multiple ways of processing that information contribute to the most accurate description and explanation of a social program.

The needs assessment was based on research and statistics from secondary sources, including OCPD’s analysis of drive-by shootings (2007) and Wilds’ research on gang sets in Oklahoma (2009). The assessments of program theory and program process relied primarily on qualitative data gained through interviews with program staff, content analyses, and case studies. For the impact assessment, evaluators conducted quantitative analysis of key performance measures provided by OCPD and data from the OSBI’s UCR program. The research design also included information related to the ongoing conduct of the evaluation, including measurement instruments (interview schedule), pre-defined parameters (assumptions and requirements from the program narrative), and scheduling milestones (key activities and completion dates).
**Phase 4: Collect and Process Information**

To collect and process information for the various assessments, the evaluators relied primarily on information provided by OCPD. For the needs and impact assessments, researchers obtained key performance measure data from OCPD and UCR data from OSBI. For its assessments of program theory and program process, researchers conducted semistandardized interviews with program staff, content analysis of documents and reports provided by OCPD, and case studies that highlighted each part of the program process. The impact assessment utilized bivariate and multivariate statistical analysis techniques.

**Phase 5: Analyze and Synthesize**

Evaluators included staff of the OSBI’s Information Services Division, Data Collection and Reporting Section, Office of Criminal Justice Statistics. Evaluators collaborated on all aspects of the analysis and synthesis of the information. Throughout the conduct of the evaluation, staff adhered to the Justice Research and Statistics Association Code of Ethics (2004).

**Phase 6: Publish and Disseminate**

Based on the information collected, processed, analyzed, and synthesized, evaluators crafted an evaluation report that addressed four separate but related assessments. This report was prepared for OCPD under the terms of a Memorandum of Understanding.
Phase 7: Assess and Document Resolutions

Lee indicates that the EMP’s seventh phase is to “appraise the program manager’s corrective action plans to ensure each action satisfies the prescribed recommendations and to bring closure to each recommendation in the report” (2008b:15). Phase seven is outside the scope of the evaluation. While the report does provide recommendations for sustaining the program, it is not the intent of either the OSBI or OCPD for follow-up on whether these recommendations are implemented.
APPENDIX

OKLAHOMA CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
GANG FIELD INTERVIEW

Date___ Time___ Photo #___
Location

Name
Address
City,State,Zip Phone

DOB Race Sex Hair/Eyes Height Weight
SDL# State AKA/Nickname

Business Phone

GANG SET KNOWN___ SUSPECTED___

____Admitted Gang Member
____Has tattoos, wears or posses clothing and/or paraphernalia or other indicia that is only associated with a specified Gang or Gangs.
____Has been arrested participating in delinquent/criminal activity with known Gang Member.
____Police records and/or observations confirm the individual's close association with known Gang Members.
____Information from a reliable informant or source identifies the individual as a Gang Member.

Vehicle Info Owner___Passenger___Driver___
License No. Yr State
Veh Yr. Make Model Style Color
Identifiers

Officer Comm #
Tattoos/Scars

Arm  L R
Arm  L R
Chest
Stomach
Back
Leg  L R
Leg  L R
Other
DOB

Associates

Reason for Stop  Case
REFERENCES


